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3. Good global governance through
trade: constitutional moorings
Joris Larik
1. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring good global governance through trade is not just a powerful
idea,1 or a global ‘strategy’;2 it is also firmly anchored in the highest laws
of the European Union (EU or Union) – its ‘constitutional charter’.3
According to the Treaty on European Union (TEU),4 the EU is to
‘promote an international system based on stronger multilateral
cooperation and good global governance’ (Article 21(2)(h)) and ‘uphold
and promote its values and interests’ (Article 3(5)) in its external
relations. One crucial means to these lofty ends is the EU’s Common
Commercial Policy (CCP). This policy is concerned a priori with the
pursuit of goals at the heart of international trade, such as ‘free and fair
trade’ (Article 3(5) TEU) and ‘the harmonious development of world
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and
on foreign direct investment’ (Article 206 Treaty on the Functioning of
1 See Chapters 1 and 2, this volume.
2 European Commission, ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World: A
Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy’, COM(2006) 567 final,
Brussels, 4 October 2006, 2: ‘Through our trade policies, we also seek to
contribute to a range of the Union’s external goals, in particular development and
neighbourhood objectives.’
3 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ [1986] ECR 1339, para 23.
4 Throughout this chapter ‘TEU’ and ‘TFEU’ refer to the consolidated
versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/1. The consolidated text of the TEU
post-Nice, but pre-Lisbon (Treaty on European Union (consolidated text) [2002]
OJ C 325/5) is referred to ‘TEU (Nice version)’. Unless otherwise indicated,
‘TEC’ refers to the Treaty establishing the European Community in the consoli-
dated version following the Nice revision, i.e. the Treaty establishing the
European Community (consolidated text) [2002] OJ C 325/33.
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the European Union (TFEU); see also Article 21(2)(e) TEU). However,
as a textual innovation through the Lisbon Treaty reform, the CCP is
henceforth to ‘be conducted in the context of the principles and object-
ives of the Union’s external action’ (Article 207(1) TFEU). Among these,
we find now a plethora of foreign policy objectives – a ‘wish list for a
better world’,5 if you will – which can be placed under the general
conceptual umbrella of ‘good global governance’.6 ‘Global governance’
can be defined as ‘the management of global problems and the pursuit of
global objectives through concerted efforts of states and other inter-
national actors’.7 ‘Good’, as an overtly normative statement, is to be
interpreted then as a vision of global governance informed by the pursuit
of global objectives according to the values and principles set out in the
EU Treaties. The latter reflects a constitutionally entrenched ‘sanguine
world view’,8 representing the external dimension of what can be called
the ‘the conscience of the Constitution’.9
Promoting ‘good global governance’ through trade policy brings
together two of the hallmarks of the EU as an international actor. On the
one hand, it concerns the area of the EU’s most obvious asset, its
economic clout. Despite tectonic shifts at work in the distribution of
global economic power, the EU, for the foreseeable future, stands its
ground as one of the world’s foremost trade powers, being ‘the world’s
largest economy’, ‘the world’s largest trading block [sic]’ and ‘the
world’s second-largest investor’.10 On the other hand, the EU is not only
5 Wiebke Drescher, ‘Ziele und Zuständigkeiten’, in Andreas Marchetti and
Claire Demesmay (eds), Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Analyse und Bewertung
(Nomos 2010) 59–71, 68 (in the original: ‘Wunschzettel für eine bessere Welt’).
6 Eleftheria Neframi, ‘Vertical Division of Competences and the Objectives
of the European Union’s External’ in Marise Cremona and Anne Thies (eds), The
European Court of Justice and External Relations: Constitutional Challenges
(Hart 2014), 73–94, 73.
7 Martin Ortega, ‘Building the Future: The EU’s Contribution to Global
Governance’, EUISS Chaillot Paper No. 100, April 2007, 46 (italics omitted).
8 Joris Larik, ‘Entrenching Global Governance: The EU’s Constitutional
Objectives caught between a Sanguine World View and a Daunting Reality’, in
Bart Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans and Jan Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in
Global Governance: The Legal Dimension (Oxford University Press 2013) 7–22.
9 To borrow an expression used in Indian constitutional law: Granville
Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Clarendon 1966) 50.
10 European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, European Union
Trade and Investment 2014 (Publications Office of the European Union 2014);
see also Marise Cremona, ‘The External Dimension of the Internal Market’, in
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a ‘formidable power in trade’ but also ‘a power through trade’.11 In other
words, trade power ‘can be used to attain other, non-economic object-
ives’.12 This relates to the idea of the EU not only as a ‘civilian power’,13
but indeed as a ‘normative power’14 which shapes the world around it by
harnessing its economic strength according to a larger vision and based
on values which go beyond the strictly economic realm.
In order to capture the constitutional moorings of the mandate to
pursue ‘good global governance’ through trade and to elucidate its
implications, the present chapter shines the spotlights on this issue
through three different lenses: historical, comparative and legal-
institutional. First, it retraces the evolution of this idea and its progressive
codification in the course of time. Second, it puts the EU’s constitutional
‘conscience’ as a trade power into a comparative context. Against this
double backdrop, the chapter then turns to the legal significance of such
norms, addressing what they can – and cannot – achieve as norms of EU
constitutional law.
2. THE EU’S EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSCIENCE
The EU did not grow a ‘constitutional conscience’ with regard to the
exercise of its trade power overnight. Just as national constitutions are
‘more deeply rooted in a nation’s history and culture’ and more ‘political
Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European
Market (Hart 2002) 351–94.
11 Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘The European Union as a Trade
Power’, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds), International Relations and
the European Union (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 275–98, 294
(emphasis in the original).
12 Marise Cremona, ‘The Union’s External Action: Constitutional Perspec-
tives’, in Giuliano Amato, Hervé Bribosia and Bruno de Witte (eds), Genesis and
Destiny of the European Constitution (Bruylant 2007) 1173–217, 1213; also
Angelos Dimopoulos, ‘The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and
Objectives of the Common Commercial Policy’ (2010) 15(2) European Foreign
Affairs Review 153, 153.
13 François Duchêne, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Richard Mayne
(ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead (Fontana 1972) 32–47.
14 Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’
(2002) 40(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 235, 245 (referring to trade
policy as norm diffusion through ‘transference’). See also Bartels (Chapter 4, this
volume) for an account of the EU’s treaty-making practice in this respect.
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in nature’ than other sources of law,15 EU constitutional law, as it stands
today, has absorbed and entrenched policy priorities and, more generally,
a world outlook shaped by the founders of the European project and six
decades of integration history. This becomes evident when retracing the
linkages of trade policy with a wider foreign policy agenda in the
Treaties over the course of time. The various norms on which this chapter
focuses are the result of an evolution which commenced with the
inception of European integration itself, and which received a new
impetus with the Convention on the Future of Europe of 2002–03. The
results of the latter eventually spilled over into the Lisbon Treaty, and
thus into the primary law in force today.
2.1 From the Communities to the Union
The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
of 1951 already reveals a ‘bigger picture’ into which economic integra-
tion could be situated. It states in its preamble ‘that world peace can be
safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that
threaten it’.16 The operative part includes objectives pertaining to inter-
national trade as a corollary of the common market. The ECSC is
mandated to ‘see that the common market [for coal and steel] is regularly
supplied, taking account of the needs of third countries’17 and to ‘further
the development of international trade and see that equitable limits are
observed in prices charged on external markets’.18 However, ‘grand
vision’ and trade objectives are not yet explicitly linked to each other.
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC
Treaty), in its original 1957 version, expresses the desire of the contract-
ing parties to contribute ‘to the progressive abolition of restrictions on
international trade’19 by virtue of a Common Commercial Policy. While
the ‘task’ of the EEC is centred on the Common Market,20 the ‘activities’
of the Community include ‘the establishment of a common customs tariff
15 Monica Claes and Maartje de Visser, ‘Reflections on Comparative
Method in European Constitutional Law’, in Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff
(eds), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press
2012) 143–69, 157.
16 First recital of the preamble, Treaty establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC Treaty), Paris, signed 18 April 1951 (emphasis added).
17 Art 3(a) ECSC Treaty.
18 Art 3(f) ECSC Treaty.
19 Sixth recital of the preamble, Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC Treaty), Rome, signed 25 March 1957.
20 Art 2 EEC Treaty.
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and of a common commercial policy toward third countries’21 as well as
‘the association of overseas countries and territories in order to increase
trade and to promote jointly economic and social development’.22 The
CCP is furthermore given specific objectives: ‘the harmonious develop-
ment of world trade’ and the ‘progressive abolition of restriction on
international trade and the lowering of customs barriers’.23 From these
various provisions, it becomes apparent that both the internal (intra-
Community) and external economic spheres are conceived of as inter-
twined and, furthermore, that trade policy is not to be conducted in
clinical isolation from other policies, such as development cooperation.
In the following decades, as European integration progressed, the
scope of activities of the Communities and later of the Union widened,
including those pertaining to what is now called ‘good global govern-
ance’. Through the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, European
Political Cooperation in the area of ‘foreign policy’ acquired a treaty
basis.24 The SEA also extended the policies of the EEC to other fields
with an external dimension, including environmental protection.25
The Treaty on European Union of 1993 introduced the rather complex
pillar structure.26 The newly established Union included the Communities
as one of the three pillars next to the inter-governmental Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA),
which was later narrowed down to Police and Judicial Cooperation in
Criminal Matters. The emergence of the CFSP is a watershed in EU
external relations law as it legally codifies and institutionalizes European
cooperation in this area.
The original Maastricht TEU included the objective for the Union ‘to
assert its identity on the international scene’.27 What this international
identity would consist of more specifically, however, was left open.
Nevertheless, Maastricht and the subsequent reforms at Amsterdam and
21 Art 3(b) EEC Treaty.
22 Art 3(k) EEC Treaty; see also Arts 131 and 132 EEC Treaty.
23 Art 110(1) EEC Treaty.
24 Art 1(3) Single European Act (SEA) [1987] OJ L 169/1. Note also the
fifth recital of the preamble to the SEA, which refers to the principles of
democracy, the rule of law and human rights, as well as to contributing to
international peace and security in external relations.
25 Art 25 SEA, introducing then Art 130r TEC (subsequently Art 174 TEC).
26 See Marise Cremona, ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the
European Union and the External Relations Powers of the European Com-
munity’, in David O’Keeffe and Patrick Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the
Maastricht Treaty (Wiley Chancery 1994) 247–58.
27 Art 2 TEU (Nice version).
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Nice added a number of provisions, both in the TEU and the amended
TEC, from which the basic features of such an identity could be gleaned.
These include the codification of ‘values’ on which the Union was
founded,28 the general objectives of the Union according to Article 2
TEU (Nice version) and the specific objectives of each policy area to
the extent that these had an external dimension. The latter consisted of
the CFSP, which had its own set of goals spelled out in the TEU,29 and
the external policies of the Community, which now also comprised, next
to the traditional CCP, development cooperation,30 and economic, finan-
cial and technical assistance to third countries.31
The list of activities of the European Community (with the adjective
‘Economic’ having been omitted from its name) was extended to include
development cooperation.32 This policy area was endowed with its own
set of specific objectives, which were to foster:
+ the sustainable economic and social development of the developing
countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among
them;
+ the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into
the world economy; and
+ the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.33
Moreover, Community development policy was to ‘contribute to the
general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule
of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental free-
doms’.34 Crucially for good global governance through trade, the
amended TEC also obliged the Community to ‘take account of the
objectives referred to in Article 177 [on development cooperation] in
the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing
countries’,35 which include trade policy as well as internal policies such
as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Internal Market.
28 Art 6 TEU (Nice version).
29 Art 11 TEU (Nice version).
30 Arts 177–181 TEC.
31 This policy was codified only by the Nice Treaty (Art 181a TEC).
32 Art 3(r) TEC.
33 Art 177(1) TEC.
34 Art 177(2) TEC.
35 Art 178 TEC.
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2.2 The Convention on the Future of Europe
Shortly after the Nice Treaty and with the enlargement of the Union to
the east and south looming, another major recasting of the basic structure
of the EU was launched. This marks the beginning of a decade-long
treaty reform process culminating in the Lisbon Treaty.36 However, the
main conceptual work, also and especially with regard to the codification
of the EU’s foreign policy agenda and the orientation of trade policy, was
done at the Convention on the Future of Europe of 2002–03.
Kicking off the reform process, the Laeken Declaration of 2001
publicly asked whether ‘Europe [does] not, now that is finally unified,
have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able
both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for
many countries and peoples’.37 In providing the answer itself, the
Declaration stated that ‘Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in
the governance of globalisation’.38 In doing so, the EU was to become ‘a
power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to
benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest’ and a ‘power
seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework’.39
The Laeken Declaration represents another leap in terms of global
ambition for the EU, now linking comprehensive international engage-
ment with overt normativity and an ‘active paradigm’,40 which eventually
found its way into the primary law by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty.
The Convention on the Future of Europe started its work in February
2002 and concluded in July 2003 by presenting to the European Council
36 See, for instance, Paul Berman, ‘From Laeken to Lisbon: The Origins and
Negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty’, in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and
Stephanie Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012)
3–39; Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford
University Press 2010) 1–31; Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and
Political Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2010) 7–63.
37 Presidency Conclusions, European Council meeting, Laeken, 14–15
December 2001, Annex I, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European
Union, 20.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Fabian Amtenbrink and Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The Active Paradigm of the
Study of the EU’s Place in the World: An Introduction’, in Fabian Amtenbrink
and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), The European Union’s Shaping of the International
Legal Order (Cambridge University Press 2013) 1–18.
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a Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.41 During the
general debate at the Convention on external action in July 2002, ‘[m]any
stressed that the values which were at the heart of the Union were
themselves an argument for a greater role globally, and that these values
should underpin and inform the Union’s external policies’.42 Subse-
quently, the idea to formulate – and constitutionally codify – a compre-
hensive normative foreign policy agenda that would guide the Union’s
external action, including trade policy, was born at the Convention.
The Præsidium of the Convention drafted what would later become
Article 3 TEU on the general objectives of the Union, which included a
paragraph on relations with the rest of the world. After a first draft had
been circulated in February 2003,43 several amendments called for the
inclusion of ‘free and fair trade’ as a goal,44 which was taken up by the
Convention in its final draft.45 The Working Group on External Action
also perceived ‘the need to define more clearly in a future Treaty the
underlying objectives of EU external action’.46 According to the Conven-
tion Secretariat, ‘Working Group VII [on External Action] opted for the
approach of defining the principles and objectives of all external action in
a single Article, therefore deleting the lists of specific objectives of each
policy area concerned in existing Articles’.47
41 For a detailed account see Peter Norman, The Accidental Constitution:
The Story of the European Convention (2nd edn, EuroComment 2005).
42 Secretariat of the European Convention, Summary Report of the Plenary
Session – Brussels, 11 and 12 July 2002, Brussels, 16 July 2002, CONV
200/02, 3.
43 Secretariat of the European Convention, Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the
Constitutional Treaty, Brussels, 6 February 2003, CONV 528/03, Annex I: Draft
Text of the Articles of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 3.
44 See Secretariat of the European Convention, Suggestion for Amendment
by the Earl of Stockton MEP, http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/Treaty/
pdf/3/Art%203a%20Stockton.pdf (accessed 22 June 2015) (proposing to add ‘the
promotion of free and fair trade in the wider world’ to the article on Union
objectives); and Secretariat of the European Convention, Suggestion for Amend-
ment by Elmar Brok and others, http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/
Treaty/pdf/3/Art%203%20EPP.pdf (accessed 22 June 2015) (proposing to add
‘free trade’, but sans ‘fair’).
45 Art 3(4) Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Brussels, 18
July 2003, CONV 850/03.
46 Secretariat of the European Convention, Working Group VII on External
Action, Summary of the Meeting held on 8 October 2002, Brussels, 11 October
2002, CONV 342/02, 6 (emphasis added).
47 Secretariat of the European Convention, Draft Articles on External Action
in the Constitutional Treaty, 23 April 2003, CONV 685/03, 25.
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This would have constituted a major shift in the way in which Union
policies had been organized in the Treaties. However, this streamlining
exercise succeeded only in part. On the one hand, the draft text submitted
by the working group to the Convention on EU external action had
indeed omitted the individual objectives for the CFSP, development
cooperation and economic, financial and technical aid. On the other hand,
the CCP had retained objectives of its own and the newly inserted section
on humanitarian aid even included new policy-specific goals. With regard
to trade policy in particular, the text proposed by Working Group VII and
endorsed by the Præsidium reproduced most of the language of former
Articles 131 and 133(1) TEC, but added references to foreign direct
investment as well as – importantly for the explicit linkage of trade and
‘good global governance’ – to the general principles and objectives of
external action (that is, to what is now Article 21 TEU).48
It was also during the work of the working group on external action
that the reference ‘to promote an international system based on stronger
multilateral cooperation and good global governance’49 was added to
what would later become Article 21 TEU. There were, furthermore, calls
to include explicit references to contribute to the preservation and
promotion of ‘global public goods’.50 These were not successful, and the
concept of a ‘global public good’ thus remains absent from the EU
Treaties. Nonetheless, even if not labelled this way, many of the ideas
enshrined in Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU undoubtedly fit the usual
definition of ‘global public goods’.51
48 Ibid 52–4.
49 Secretariat of the European Convention, Working Group VII on External
Action, Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, Brussels, 16
December 2002, CONV 459/02, 3.
50 For example, Secretariat of the European Convention, Suggestion for
Amendment by Mr Voggenhuber and others, http://european-convention.
europa.eu/docs/Treaty/pdf/861/Art%20III%20188%20Voggenhuber%20EN.pdf
(accessed 22 June 2015); Secretariat of the European Convention, Suggestion for
Amendment by Mr Brok and others, http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/
Treaty/pdf/861/Art1Brok%20EN.pdf (accessed 22 June 2015); and Secretariat of
the European Convention, Suggestion for Amendment by Mr Ingvar Svensonn,
http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/Treaty/pdf/861/Art1Svensson%20EN.pdf
(accessed 22 June 2015), who names as examples in the explanatory note
‘biodiversity, preservation of the atmosphere, access to fresh water, and effective
prevention of HIV/AIDS’.
51 Cf. Daniel Bodansky, ‘What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods,
International Law, and Legitimacy’ (2012) 23(3) European Journal of Inter-
national Law 651, 652–4.
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The text agreed by the Convention and transmitted to the President of
the European Council,52 compared with the situation of the Nice Treaty
and what preceded it, certainly shows progress in terms of codifying the
foreign policy agenda of the EU.53 However, by using former Article 11
TEU (Nice version) on CFSP objectives as the template for the general
article on EU external action (now Article 21 TEU), and without
replacing it in the section on the CFSP, the latter policy is deprived of its
own set of specific objectives, as is the section on economic, financial
and technical aid. In contrast, the external policies not only on trade, but
also on development and the newly codified section on humanitarian aid,
all received a set of policy-specific objectives. A distinction thus remains
between the overall objectives of EU external action – its contribution to
‘good global governance’ – and the specific goals of its trade policy.
2.3 The Lisbon Treaty
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed by the
Member States in Rome in October 2004. However, after the failed
referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, a subsequent ‘period
of reflection’ led to the drafting of a ‘reform treaty’ that would not
replace the existing treaties but would amend them.54 The ‘constitutional
concept’, pushed by the Convention, was officially dropped by the
Council.55 However, this should not be confused with depriving the legal
order of the Union of its constitutional features.56 The resulting Lisbon
52 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Brussels, 18 July
2003, CONV 850/03.
53 See Marise Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Rela-
tions and External Action’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 1347,
1348–9.
54 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007
(Lisbon Treaty) [2007] OJ C 306/1. See further Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The EU on
the Road from the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty’ (2008) Jean
Monnet Working Paper 03/08.
55 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 21 and 22
June 2007, 20 July 2007, 11177/1/07 REV 1, Annex I: IGC Mandate, 15.
56 See, in particular, Stefan Griller, ‘Is this a Constitution? Remarks on a
Contested Concept’, in Stefan Griller and Jacques Ziller (eds), The Lisbon
Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 2008)
21–56 (arguing in favour of the constitutional credentials of the EU after
Lisbon).
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Treaty, after going through some ratification troubles of its own, entered
into force on 1 December 2009.57
The Lisbon Treaty incorporated virtually all of the reforms proposed
by the Constitutional Treaty, leaving aside mostly symbolic provisions
such as those on the flag, the anthem, the motto and the term ‘Union
Foreign Minister’.58 The reformed codified foreign policy agenda of the
EU had not been abandoned or rolled back in the Lisbon Treaty. In terms
of the basic structure – which, under Lisbon, comprises two treaties (the
TEU and TFEU) – a relocation of the articles on the general objectives of
EU external action took place. In the Constitutional Treaty, one article
introduced a comprehensive part on EU ‘External Action’ containing all
the external policies of the Union. Under the Lisbon Treaty, by contrast,
this article (Article 21 TEU) was situated in the TEU at the start of its
Title V on ‘General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and
Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy’. This
title contains merely the external policy area of the CFSP/CSDP, while
the others, including trade policy, are now to be found in Part V of the
TFEU on ‘External Action by the Union’. Nonetheless, Article 205
TFEU, which introduces Part V, refers back to Article 21 TEU.
In the primary law now in force, the idea of ensuring good governance
through trade has become a constitutional mandate for the EU. On the
one hand, the Union is to continue to pursue goals intimately connected
with trade (that is, to promote ‘free and fair trade’)59 and ‘contribute, in
the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign
direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers’.60 On
the other hand – and this is the novelty post-Lisbon61 – its trade policy
‘shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the
Union’s external action’ at large (that is, all the objectives listed in
Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU). These include the promotion of the Union’s
values and interests, and contributing also to peace, democracy, the rule
of law, security, sustainable development, eradication of poverty, human
rights and respect for international law – a kaleidoscope of aspects of
what the EU considers to be ‘good global governance’.
57 See Piris (n 36) 49–63.
58 Ibid 34.
59 Art 3(5) TEU.
60 Art 206 TFEU, similarly also Art 21(2)(e) TEU.
61 Dimopoulos (n 12) 161–3.
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3. TRADE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The EU now boasts in its primary law a very ambitious foreign policy
agenda. With regard to trade policy, the Treaties also provide policy-
specific goals but these are explicitly put under the umbrella of this wider
agenda. Given the prominence of this agenda in the current primary law,
it is worthwhile to survey other constitutions, in order to determine how
‘special’ the EU is in this respect. Are other trade powers endowed with
such a ‘constitutional conscience’? To this end, the following paragraphs
will elaborate upon two points. First, in general, many contemporary
constitutions address ‘global governance’ at least in abstract terms, for
instance, through calls for a more ‘just’ world order. Second, it seems to
be rather rare for a constitution to address specifically trade policy and its
goals, much less to link it to a wider constitutionally entrenched foreign
policy agenda. Hence, the latter remains a speciality of the EU.
3.1 ‘Good Global Governance’: ConstitutionalAcknowledgements
They are part of a wider trend in constitutional design, which earlier I
termed ‘dynamic internationalization’62 – the progressive codification of
foreign policy goals, in many cases with idealistic underpinnings.For
instance, the German Basic Law acknowledges, in a clearly universalist
tone, ‘inviolable and inalienable human rights as the foundation of every
community, of peace and justice in the world’.63 The Portuguese Consti-
tution, furthermore, stresses that Portugal’s international relations will be
governed, inter alia, by the overarching objectives of ‘the emancipation
and progress of humanity’64 and ‘the creation of an international order
capable of safeguarding peace and justice in relations between peoples’.65
The Bulgarian Constitution, in a similar vein, makes ‘the promotion of a
just international order’66 an objective of the state.
62 Joris Larik, ‘Shaping the International Order as an EU Objective’, in
Fabian Amtenbrink and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), The European Union’s Shaping
of the International Legal Order (Cambridge University Press 2013) 62–87, 64.
63 Art 1(2), German Constitution.
64 Art 7(1), Portuguese Constitution; on Portuguese constitutional foreign
policy objectives in this provision see Paulo Jorge Canelas de Castro, ‘Portugal’s
World Outlook in the Constitution of 1976’ (1995) 71 Boletim da Faculdade de
Direito da Universidade de Coimbra 489.
65 Art 7(2), Portuguese Constitution.
66 Art 24(2), Bulgarian Constitution.
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Beyond Europe, similar constitutional language can be found. The
preamble to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, today
undeniably one of the world’s leading economic and trade powers,67
contains a number of guidelines for its foreign policy. It stresses that
China adheres to an independent foreign policy as well as to the five
principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual
non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations
and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries; China consistently
opposes imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism, works to strengthen unity
with the people of other countries, supports the oppressed nations and the
developing countries in their just struggle to win and preserve national
independence and develop their national economies, and strives to safeguard
world peace and promote the cause of human progress.68
This language can be seen as less proactive in exporting and promoting
normative standards around the world.69 Nonetheless, the preamble does
exhibit the parameters of what China would consider not to be ‘good
global governance’ – for instance, interference and imperialism.
The Japanese Constitution, too, exhibits references concerning the
‘global common good’. It expresses the determination ‘to preserve
[Japan’s] security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the
peace-loving peoples of the world’ as well as the belief ‘that no nation is
responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are
universal’.70 The Constitution of Brazil, moreover, enumerates ‘funda-
mental principles’ governing the country’s foreign policy; next to
‘national independence’ these include ‘cooperation among people for the
progress of humanity’.71, while certainly verbose, from a comparative
point of view the EU Treaties are by no means unique in expressing a
desire for their constitutional organs to contribute to ‘good global
governance’ or similar notions such as ‘a just international order’.
67 Hanns Günther Hilpert, China’s Trade Policy: Dominance without the
Will to Lead, SWP Research Paper No. 1, January 2014, 7–10.
68 Preamble, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
69 The ‘five principles’ originate from a treaty between China and India in
1954 and have since been the cornerstones of Chinese foreign policy: see Anu
Bradford and Eric Posner, ‘Universal Exceptionalism in International Law’
(2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 3, 26.
70 Preamble, Japanese Constitution.
71 Art 4, Brazilian Constitution.
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3.2 Good Governance through Trade: an EU Speciality
Regardless of more general references that fit the theme of ‘good global
governance’, only a few constitutions address trade policy in terms of its
substantive goals.72 The presence of specific trade goals can be explained
through the particular historical trajectory of the EU, as outlined in the
previous section, which started out with an emphasis on economic
integration and the corresponding formulation of a common trade policy.
However, linking trade policy with a wider normative agenda is a
distinctive feature of the EU – one which cannot be explained by its
original nature as a functional international organization.
A notable exception to this general rule is the Swiss Constitution,
which is similar to the EU Treaties, albeit to a limited degree. Next to
general references in the realm of ‘good global governance’ – such as its
commitment ‘to an enduring conservation of the natural resources and to
a peaceful and just international order’,73 to ‘the alleviation of need and
poverty in the world, and to the respect for human rights […]’74 – the
Swiss Constitution contains an article devoted specifically to ‘foreign
trade’, which reads:
1. The Confederation safeguards the interests of the Swiss economy
abroad.
2. In special cases, it may take measures to protect the domestic
economy. It may, if necessary, depart from the principle of eco-
nomic freedom.75
On the one hand, this is similar to the EU Treaties in that both a
constitutional call for ‘good global governance’ and an external trade
policy geared towards certain ends are present in Swiss constitutional
law. On the other hand, what is missing is a clear link between the two
elements – that is, an instruction to use trade policy for the benefit of the
wider normative agenda. In the Swiss case, the constitutional mandate, as
72 Foreign trade is sometimes made a federal competence in federal systems
(e.g. Art 8(3), United States constitution). This is then simply a matter of
allocating power between different levels of government, rather than of guiding
trade policy towards certain normative ends.
73 Art 2(4), Swiss Constitution.
74 Art 54(2), Swiss Constitution.
75 Art 101, Swiss Constitution. On the proliferation of ‘programmatic’
norms in general in Swiss constitutional law see Ulrich Häferlin, Walter Haller
and Helen Keller, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht (8th edn, Schulthess 2012)
57.
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far as foreign policy is concerned, is ‘good global governance’ and an
economically oriented, assertive trade policy, rather than ‘good global
governance’ through trade policy in the fashion of the EU Treaties.
4. LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE: MANDATE, INSTITUTIONS
AND IMPLEMENTATION
As the previous sections have demonstrated, the idea of promoting good
global governance through trade as a constitutional mandate for the EU
has grown over decades and is now firmly established in the primary law.
Such a constitutional mandate, moreover, is rather rare from a compara-
tive perspective. While many constitutions today give a nod to ‘good
global governance’ at large, making the explicit connection between trade
policy and global governance is a speciality of the EU. In this section, the
legal significance of such constitutional provisions will be analysed.
What force do they have as legal norms, what do they entail for the
institutions called upon in the Treaties to pursue this normative agenda
through the CCP, and how are they being implemented? To shed light on
these aspects of the constitutional moorings of ‘good global governance
through trade’ in the EU, the following paragraphs will address first the
general legal significance of such externally oriented constitutional
objectives, followed by their role in the institutional architecture of the
EU, and lastly an illustration of how they are implemented in EU
legislation with a trade dimension.
4.1 ‘Good Global Governance’as a Constitutional Mandate
As part of the EU Treaties – understood as the ‘constitutional charter’76
of the EU – the contents of Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU, as well as Articles
205–207(1) TFEU, are legally binding norms of primary law. Hence,
based on the principle of primacy, they reign supreme over any secondary
EU legislation as well as over the law of the Member States.77 Even if by
76 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ (n 3); also Joined Cases C-402/05 P and
C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat [2008] ECR I-6351, para 281. Further, Paul
Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union’ (2001) 7
European Law Journal 125 (arguing that the EU legal order exhibits ‘thick’
constitutional features); and Griller (n 56).
77 The principle of primacy does not feature in the EU Treaties, but see
Declaration No. 17 concerning Primacy, attached to the Lisbon Treaty. Further,
Piris (n 36) 79–82.
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certain commentators their content is ridiculed as ‘redolent of mother-
hood and apple pie’,78 their content and status are the result of the
drafting and ratification process of the primary law as it stands today. In
other words, to contribute to good global governance through trade is the
stated and entrenched intention of the Union’s constitutional legislator
(pouvoir constituant).79
That being said, this constitutional mandate is not endowed with either
a particularly strong obligatory or prohibitive force, at least in any
immediate sense. In an early judgment, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) ruled that ‘it will always be necessary to
reconcile to a certain degree the various objectives of Article 3 [ECSC
Treaty] since it is clearly impossible to attain them all fully and
simultaneously as those objectives constitute general principles which
must be observed and harmonized as far as possible’.80
Even though the Court noted that the objectives enshrined in the
Treaties have ‘obligatory force’,81 their ‘normativity’82 is thus rather
limited in at least two ways. First, these provisions by no means establish
individual rights: no individual may address the CJEU and claim that the
Treaties were violated by adopting (or failing to adopt) a particular trade
measure that does not sufficiently advance the cause of, for instance,
promoting the rule of law or democracy. As the CJEU has ruled regarding
the objectives of the former Community, these ‘cannot have the effect
either of imposing legal obligations on the Member States or of confer-
ring rights on individuals’.83
Second, even aside from individual standing, failure to fully live up to
constitutional objectives, especially those of such a broadly defined and
ambitious nature, is in itself unlikely to amount to an infringement of the
Treaties to be invoked by the EU institutions and Member States before
the CJEU. Only in the most extreme cases of manifest disregard would
this become arguable. Regarding the objectives of the CCP in particular,
78 Alan Dashwood and others, Wyatt & Dashwood’s European Union Law
(6th edn, Hart 2011) 903, referring to Art 21 TEU.
79 Larik (n 8) 19–21.
80 Case 8/57 Groupement des hauts fourneaux et aciéries belges v High
Authority [1958] ECR English special edition 245, 253.
81 Case 6/72 Continental Can [1973] ECR 215, para 25.
82 On the normativité limitée of constitutional objectives in general, Pierre
de Montalivet, Les objectifs de valeur constitutionnelle (Dalloz 2006) 563.
83 Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique [1991] ECR 1991 I-107, para 9. Note
also Case C-181/06 Deutsche Lufthansa [2007] ECR I-5903, para 31 (stating that
the codified objectives and activities of the former Community ‘do not lay down
obligations on Member States or public or private bodies’).
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the Court made clear in the Dürbeck case that the ‘“aim to contribute, in
the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade […]”, cannot
be interpreted as prohibiting the Community from enacting, upon pain of
committing an infringement of the Treaty, any measure liable to affect
trade’.84
This limited legal force also finds confirmation in the long-standing
case law of the Court of Justice regarding the position of World Trade
Organization law within the Union legal order, according to which both
individuals and Member States are generally barred from invoking
violations of these rules before EU courts. The CJEU denied this with a
reference to the necessary ‘scope for manoeuvre’ for the EU institutions
in conducting trade negotiations,85 and allowed derogations from this rule
only in the case of narrowly defined exceptions.86
Hence, for all practical purposes, these norms are not to be seen as
strict rules which can be either respected or violated. Rather, it is more
appropriate to conceive of them as ‘optimization requirements’ in the
sense of Robert Alexy: ‘norms that require that something be realised to
the greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities’.87
The slight changes in wording brought about in the Lisbon Treaty
regarding trade objectives do not alter this general finding. Pre-Lisbon,
the CCP was to ‘aim to contribute, in the common interest, to the
harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of
restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers’.88
Under current Article 206 TFEU, the ‘Union shall contribute’ to these
goals.89 For one commentator this signifies a shift from ‘the aspirational
84 Case 112/80 Dürbeck [1981] ECR 1095, para 44.
85 Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, para 46; and Case
C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-0973; see further Antonello Tan-
credi, ‘EC Practice in the WTO: How Wide is the “Scope for Manoeuvre”?’
(2004) 15(5) European Journal of International Law 933.
86 Joris Larik, ‘Much More Than Trade: The Common Commercial Policy
in a Global Context’, in Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the
Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest
of the World (Hart 2011) 13–46, 37–40; and Panos Koutrakos, EU International
Relations Law (2nd edn, Hart 2015) 301–7.
87 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press
2002) 47. Note also Karl-Peter Sommermann, Staatsziele und Staatszielbestim-
mungen (Mohr Siebeck 1997) 361 (calling objectives of the state optimization
requirements ‘par excellence’).
88 Art 131(1) TEC (emphasis added).
89 Art 206 TFEU (emphasis added).
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character of the liberalization objective’ to one of a ‘mandatory nature’.90
However, this in itself would not make trade liberalization a more
‘binding’ goal than the other external relations objectives of the Union,
including its global governance agenda. The language employed with
regard to these objectives is essentially the same.91
Moreover, the various cross-references between the general external
action objectives and the policy-specific objectives, as well as the
principle of coherence, militate against any strict hierarchies among
objectives. According to Article 21(3) TEU, ‘[t]he Union shall respect the
principles and pursue the objectives’ that inspire its external action in all
its external policies as well as in the ‘external aspects of its other
policies’. The CCP, as the Treaties clearly state, ‘shall be conducted in
the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external
action’ (Article 207(1) TFEU). In addition, the weak binding force of
such objectives makes discussion about any strict hierarchies between
them a rather idle exercise. In view of the various evocations of the
principle of ‘coherence’ and ‘consistency’ between different policies,92 all
of the EU’s external objectives have to be pursued as an ensemble,
geared towards its overall vision of ‘good global governance’.
4.2 InstitutionalArchitecture: Legal Basis and Exclusivity
While there are various examples of EU measures which harness trade
policy for ‘good global governance’, a central question is which institu-
tion is responsible, and of which prerogatives it can avail itself. Here, the
constitutional moorings of ‘good global governance’ play an important
role, with their most palpable legal effect being a lens for constitutional
interpretation.93
This has two related institutional implications regarding the use of
trade policy for the benefit of ‘good global governance’. First, in the
90 Dimopoulos (n 12) 160.
91 Cf Art 3(5) TEU: ‘[The EU] shall contribute to peace, security, the
sustainable development of the Earth […]’ (emphasis added); Art 208(1), 2nd
subpara TFEU: ‘Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary
objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty’
(emphasis added).
92 Art 16(6), 3rd subpara TEU; Art 21(3), 2nd subpara TEU; Art 7 TFEU.
93 Larik (n 62) 82–5; generally for EU objectives, Koen Lenaerts and Piet
Van Nuffel, European Union Law (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 111; and
Christian Calliess, ‘Kollektive Ziele und Prinzipien im Verfassungsrecht der EU
– Bestandsaufnahme, Wirkungen und Perspektiven’ (2003) 92 Archiv für Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie-Beihefte 85, 92.
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horizontal relationship, concerning the determination of the correct legal
basis and the applicable institutional procedures; second, in the vertical
dimension, regarding the scope of permissible action of the Member
States on the international stage, and also in terms of the pursuit of their
own respective visions of ‘good global governance’.94
These aspects are of particular importance regarding the CCP, the
scope and nature of which as a matter of competence have seen drastic
changes in the course of time.95 Moreover, as the EU legal order has
matured over the decades – coupled with the introduction of more
policies and competences, as well as value statements and fundamental
rights catalogues – Union competences and objectives have parted ways
and exist now as two distinct norm categories in EU constitutional law.96
However, through interpretation, the latter is still capable of shaping the
outer limits of the former.
The CCP, being rather narrowly defined in the beginning and inti-
mately connected with the fledgling Common Market, kindled the idea of
an a priori exclusive external EU competence in the case law of the
CJEU, which, in the words of the Court, was ‘incompatible with the
freedom to which the Member States could lay claim by invoking a
concurrent power’.97 Nevertheless, for want of other suitable legal bases
for external action in the Treaties, the Court accepted trade policy to be
used also for development cooperation and humanitarian aid,98 until
those became endowed with their proper legal bases through subsequent
treaty reform. This codification of additional policies with their own legal
bases and procedures ‘had a significant impact on the use of the CCP for
94 The two dimensions are intricately linked in the institutional set-up of the
EU, as ‘the “vertical” interests of the Member States will be felt horizontally
through the Council’: Bart Van Vooren, EU External Relations Law and the
European Neighbourhood Policy: A Paradigm for Coherence (Routledge 2012)
71.
95 Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd edn, Oxford University
Press 2011) 11–69.
96 Joris Larik, ‘From Speciality to a Constitutional Sense of Purpose: On the
Changing Role of the Objectives of the European Union’ (2014) 63 International
& Comparative Law Quarterly 935.
97 Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355.
98 Case C-54/86 Commission v Council (GSP) [1987] ECR I-1493; also
Dimopoulos (n 12) 157–8; and Panos Koutrakos, ‘Legal Basis and Delimitation
of Competence in EU External Relations’, in Marise Cremona and Bruno de
Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart
2008) 171–98.
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pursuing non-trade objectives’.99 So did the changing scope of the CCP
itself, as it represented a moving target in the course of time in terms of
using it as a legal basis. Because of the widening of the trade agenda in
view of the founding of the WTO in 1995, the CCP came to be
considered a partly shared competence.100
The pre-Lisbon era hence saw a number of high-profile cases in which
different EU institutions fought over whether or not a certain measure or
action fell within the scope of the CCP. Typically, the Commission, as the
institution with a more powerful position in CCP matters than in other
policy areas of a shared character (such as environmental protection),
would argue for a legal basis in the CCP, while the Council would argue
for the proper legal basis being outside the CCP.101
After Lisbon, the CCP is again entirely exclusive,102 and covers a
wider field than ever before. It now includes trade in services (including
of the cultural and audio-visual kind), commercial aspects of intellectual
property, as well as foreign direct investment.103 Being now both entirely
exclusive in nature and broader than ever before in scope, using the
post-Lisbon CCP as a vehicle for promoting ‘good global governance’
has important legal consequences. According to the TFEU, in such areas
‘only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member
States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union
or for the implementation of Union acts’ (Article 2(1) TFEU). Moreover,
the Commission would be the obvious ‘Union negotiator’ for inter-
national trade agreements (Article 218(3) TFEU), while the Member
States would be barred from acting on their own behalf internationally in
this area.
99 Dimopoulos (n 12) 157.
100 Opinion 1/94 [1995] ECR I-05267; and later Opinion 1/08 [2009] ECR
I-11129; see also Christoph Herrmann, ‘Common Commercial Policy after
Nice: Sisyphus would have done a Better Job’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law
Review 7.
101 See Case C-281/01 Commission v Council (Energy Star Agreement)
[2002] I-12049; Case C-94/03 Commission v Council (Rotterdam Convention)
[2006] ECR I-1; Case C-178/03 Commission v Parliament and Council [2006]
ECR I-107; and Case C-411/06 Commission v Parliament and Council (Waste
shipments) [2009] ECR I-7585.
102 Art 3(1)(e) TFEU. Note, however, the caveat concerning the area of
transport in Art 207(5) TFEU.
103 Art 207 TFEU. While the exact delimitation of trade in services,
commercial aspects of intellectual property and foreign direct investment may be
difficult, they would seem to match the scope of the relevant WTO agreements:
Eeckhout (n 95) 59.
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In this respect, there exists an inherent tension in the idea of a ‘global’
or ‘comprehensive approach’,104 which advances a broader normative
agenda, and the ‘constitutional’105 requirement to identify the proper
legal basis, which is an expression of the principle of conferred powers in
the EU.106 The TEU makes it abundantly clear, however desirable the
objectives pursued may be, that the EU shall pursue them ‘by appropriate
means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it
in the Treaties’.107 In this context, regardless of any overarching norma-
tive ‘vision’, policy-specific goals become a key tool that can be utilized
in determining within which area of EU policy a particular measure, in
view of its aim and content, fits best.108
While today the CFSP is deprived of specific objectives in the Treaties,
which have to be ascertained instead through judicial interpretation,109
the CCP can rely on the objectives of Article 206 TFEU to this end.
However, this does not mean that as soon as a non-trade related ‘global
governance’ goal enters the picture, the CCP cannot be used as the sole
legal basis of a measure.
In the emerging post-Lisbon case law, promoting a wide notion of
‘global governance’ – for instance, by exporting certain rules and
standards beyond the borders of the EU through the CCP – has received
judicial endorsement. In 2013, the CJEU interpreted the reference in
Article 207(1) TFEU to the general EU external action objectives in the
following manner:
[I]t follows from Article 207(1) TFEU – and, in particular, from the second
sentence of that provision, in the words of which the common commercial
policy belongs within the context of ‘the Union’s external action’ – that the
common commercial policy relates to trade with non-member countries, not
to trade in the internal market.110
104 From the vantage point of international crisis management, see European
Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External
Conflict and Crises’, JOIN(2013), 30 final Brussels, 11 December 2013.
105 Opinion 2/00 (Cartagena Protocol) [2001] ECR I-09713, para 5.
106 Art 5(1) and (2) TEU.
107 Art 3(6) TEU.
108 Dimopoulos (n 12) 166.
109 See Case C-130/10 Parliament v Council, EU:C:2012:472, para 62; and
Case C-220/14 P, Ahmed Abdelaziz Ezz, EU:C:2015:147, para 46.
110 Case C-137/12 Commission v Council (European Convention on the legal
protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access),
Constitutional moorings 63
Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Wouters-Global_governance_through_trade / Division: 03Ch3Larik /Pg. Position: 21 / Date: 24/8
JOBNAME: Wouters PAGE: 22 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Tue Sep 1 14:52:19 2015
Hence, it was used here as a way to distinguish the CCP from the
Internal Market. In this case this was a response to the Council, which
had used Article 114 TFEU on the approximation of laws (together with
Article 218(5) TFEU) as the legal basis for concluding an international
agreement, rather than the CCP with Article 207(4) TFEU. The further
reasoning of the Court reveals a wide understanding of the CCP, which is
well able to capture a wider agenda of ‘global governance’: ‘An EU act
falls within that policy if it relates specifically to international trade in
that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and
has direct and immediate effects on trade.’111
The CJEU noted further that the signing of the international agreement
at issue in the case ‘on behalf of the European Union, which the
contested decision is intended to authorise, is undertaken with a view to
encouraging broader ratification of the Convention by Member States of
the Council of Europe’.112 Hence, the goal was to extend EU regulation
‘beyond the borders of the European Union’.113 The Court stressed that
this goal, ‘which can be seen […] to be the primary objective of that
decision, therefore has a specific connection with international trade in
those services, by dint of which it can legitimately be linked to the
common commercial policy’.114
This continues the string of case law of the CJEU from before the
Lisbon Treaty, according to which trade measures which also contain
non-trade components can be comfortably placed on a CCP legal
basis.115 While this favours the institutional position of the Commission
after Lisbon, it also brings the European Parliament to the forefront
since, as far as international agreements are concerned, its consent is
required now before trade agreements may be concluded by the EU.116
The position of these institutions is thus strengthened, but they are also
EU:C:2013:675, para 56; also Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi Aventis
Deutschland, EU:C:2013:520, para 50.
111 Commission v Council (n 110) para 57; Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi
Aventis Deutschland (n 110) para 51.
112 Commission v Council (n 110) para 57.
113 Ibid, para 63.
114 Ibid, para 65.
115 Dimopoulos (n 12) 158–9. However, the trade component must be seen as
predominant in such cases. In the case of a twofold trade and non-trade purpose
which are both equally important and inextricably linked, a dual legal basis may
be necessary; cf Commission v Council (Rotterdam Convention) (n 101). Further,
Koutrakos (n 98).
116 Art 207(2) and (3) TFEU together with Art 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU; Eeckhout
(n 95) 459.
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called upon to be protagonists in advancing ‘good global governance’
through trade.
The Council retains important supervisory powers in trade policy
under Article 207 TFEU, including through the Trade Policy Committee
(formerly known as the ‘Article 133 Committee’), preserving its role in
promoting the wider normative agenda through the CCP. However, the
implications for its constituents, the Member States, are drastic. Given
the exclusive nature of the entirety of the CCP, Member States are barred
from acting on their own behalf on the international stage. This means
also that they can no longer pursue their own visions of ‘good global
governance’, constitutionally codified or otherwise, in the international
arena as far as the CCP is concerned: for them in such cases it is
henceforth ‘good global governance’ through the EU and its trade policy.
In this sense, EU external action becomes less ‘polyphonic’.117 In the
CCP, the Union speaks with one voice on the international stage, and the
message it is constitutionally mandated to spread globally is to be found
in Articles 21 and 3(5) TEU.
4.3 Implementing ‘Good Global Governance’through Trade
Union objectives are to guide the exercise of EU powers, and their
pursuit is to resonate through the secondary legislation and other acts of
the Union.118 This corresponds with a view of coherence as goal-oriented
‘complementarity’119 and ‘positive synergy’.120 As Bart van Vooren
rightly argues, ‘coherence thus implies that norms, actors and instruments
are positively aligned towards EU Treaty objectives’.121 Despite the weak
legal force and the width of the EU’s constitutional mandate to foster
good global governance, including through its trade policy, there are a
number of examples of trade or trade-related measures through which the
EU seeks to implement this overarching vision. Two recent initiatives of
117 Christophe Hillion, ‘Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations: The
Significance of the “Duty of Cooperation”’, in Christophe Hillion and Panos
Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in
the World (Hart 2010) 87–115, 87.
118 Calliess (n 93) 90. See, for example, Geraets and Natens (Chapter 11, this
volume).
119 Marise Cremona, ‘Coherence in European Union Foreign Relations Law’,
in Panos Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspec-
tives (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 55–92, 89.
120 Bart Van Vooren (n 94) 69.
121 Ibid 71 (emphasis added).
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the EU can serve to illustrate this: one is squarely a CCP measure; the
other is not.
First, the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), in its revised
legal framework,122 is arguably the most obvious example. It is formal-
ized as a measure with a CCP legal basis but which clearly pursues a
wider agenda.123 Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012 is based on Article 207
TFEU (CCP), but its preamble also recalls that ‘[t]he Union’s common
commercial policy shall be guided by the principles and pursue the
objectives set out in the general provisions on the Union’s external
action, laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)’
(second recital). More specifically, the Regulation notes in the fourth
recital that
[t]he Union’s common commercial policy is to be consistent with and to
consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development
cooperation, laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), in particular the eradication of poverty and the
promotion of sustainable development and good governance in the developing
countries.
Among the various ways to obtain preferences through this scheme, the
‘special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good
governance’ (GSP+) stands out as the prime illustration of harnessing
trade policy for the benefit of a wider normative agenda. Under GSP+,
developing countries eligible for the general scheme can gain additional
preferences on the condition that they ratify a number of conventions
listed in an annex and effectively implement them (Article 9(1) of
Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012). These include international treaties on
human rights, international labour rights, environmental protection and
good governance, as listed in Annex VIII of the Regulation. To this
end, the respective third countries also submit themselves to being
monitored by the European Commission (Article 13). In the event of
non-compliance with these conventions, benefits may be withdrawn
(Article 15).
However, such measures are not always required to have their legal
basis, or ‘centre of gravity’, in the CCP, but can still harness trade policy
to advance the EU’s entrenched global normative agenda. An example of
122 Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012 of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of
generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/
2008 [2012] OJ L 303/1.
123 See further Chapters 8 and 9, this volume by Laura Beke and Nicolas
Hachez, and James Yap respectively.
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this is Regulation (EU) No. 995/2010 on timber and timber products,124
which, by contrast, is based on Article 192 TFEU – the EU’s environ-
mental policy. This is because the rationale of this measure is environ-
mental protection in terms of ‘maintaining biodiversity and ecosystem
functions and protecting the climate system’ (first recital) and a contribu-
tion ‘to the Union’s climate change mitigation efforts’ (third recital). The
commercial dimension of the Regulation, however, is apparent in the fact
that it ‘lays down the obligations of operators who place timber and
timber products on the internal market for the first time, as well as the
obligations of traders’ (Article 1). It does so by establishing various
duties on operators and traders with a view to ensuring, through tracing
and due diligence, that the timber and timber products introduced into the
EU market comply with the exporting state’s (timber) legislation.
Whatever their legal basis or the institutional and procedural setting,
the basic idea behind these and other EU measures is the same:
compliance with internationally recognized rules and standards which
accord with the EU’s vision of ‘good global governance’ lowers the
barriers to accessing the EU internal market. This is one of the EU’s most
important instruments – if not the most important instrument for leverage
which it has at its disposal. In doing so, the EU and its institutions
breathe life into the constitutionally entrenched goals of EU external
action and respond to the constitutional mandate they entail.
5. CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to elucidate the notion of ‘good global govern-
ance though trade’ as a constitutional matter for the EU. It has done so
through a combined historical, comparative and legal-institutional
analysis, which yields the following main conclusions. First, from the
outset of European integration, both the centrality of the CCP in the
external relations of the EU, as well as a wider normative agenda, found
expression in the primary law. Over the course of several decades the
latter became more clearly articulated, with the Convention on the Future
of Europe devising the EU’s comprehensive ‘mission statement’,125 now
124 Regulation (EU) No. 995/2010 of 20 October 2010 laying down the
obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market
[2010] OJ L 295/23. See further Chapter 11, this volume by Dylan Geraets and
Bregt Natens.
125 Bart Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans and Jan Wouters, ‘The Legal
Dimension of Global Governance: What Role for the EU?’, in Bart Van Vooren,
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to be found in Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU and its explicit link to trade
policy through Article 207(1) TFEU.
Second, such an explicit constitutional linkage between trade policy
and general contributions to ‘good global governance’ represents a
peculiarity from a comparative perspective. Only few constitutions
address trade policy from a substantive point of view. The EU does so for
historical reasons, and even after Lisbon the CCP retains objectives of its
own. However, a general constitutional mandate to utilize trade policy to
advance this wider global normative agenda is a veritable novelty in
constitutional language.
Third, from a legal-institutional point of view, the introduction of
Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU makes the pursuit of ‘good global governance’
along the lines expressed in these provisions an obligation of constitu-
tional rank, which is to guide the exercise of EU powers in its external
action. However, the width of these goals and their weak bindingness
limit their obligatory and prohibitive force, not least for adjudicatory
purposes. Rather, they serve for constitutional interpretation. As the
emerging post-Lisbon case law affirms, the CCP – now wider in scope
than ever and entirely exclusive – can serve as the legal basis (or at least
one of the legal bases) for a broad range of measures which advance a
wider agenda. As a consequence, this strengthens not only the institu-
tional position of the Commission in EU external action, but also that of
the Parliament as far as international agreements are concerned. The
Member States, by contrast, will have to pursue their own ideas of ‘good
global governance’ through the Council as far as matters pertaining to the
post-Lisbon CCP are concerned. Regardless of the legal basis and the
institutional procedures to be followed, the only way to live up to this
constitutional mandate is through specific measures. Post-Lisbon, there is
evidence of trade measures that explicitly acknowledge the link with the
wider normative agenda of Article 21 TEU, and also of other measures,
for instance in the environmental domain, with a clear trade dimension.
Both types, their different legal bases notwithstanding, must be consid-
ered as steps which harness the EU’s commercial clout in the interest of
promoting ‘good global governance’ and the coherence between different
policy domains.
In sum, the primary law post-Lisbon is abundantly clear: ‘good global
governance’ through trade not just a (fleeting) policy preference; it is a
constitutional duty firmly moored in the Treaties. Consequently, the trade
Steven Blockmans and Jan Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in Global Governance:
The Legal Dimension (Oxford University Press 2013).
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policy of the EU is certainly no end in itself, but a powerful means to
‘higher ends’126 now prominently enshrined in the highest laws of the
EU.
126 From War to Peace: A European Tale, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture on
behalf of the European Union by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the
European Council, and José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European
Commission, Oslo, 10 December 2012, in which then Commission President
Barroso noted that European unity ‘is not an end in itself, but a means to higher
ends’.
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